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Abstract
We introduce the notion of exchangeable equilibria of a symmetric bimatrix game,
defined as those correlated equilibria in which players’ strategy choices are condition-
ally independently and identically distributed given some hidden variable. We give
several game-theoretic interpretations and a version of the “revelation principle”. Geo-
metrically, the set of exchangeable equilibria is convex and lies between the symmetric
Nash equilibria and the symmetric correlated equilibria. Exchangeable equilibria can
achieve higher expected utility than symmetric Nash equilibria.
Keywords: Correlated equilibrium, exchangeability, equilibrium concepts, symmet-
ric games.
1 Introduction
The contribution of this paper is to introduce exchangeable equilibria, a solution concept
for symmetric games intermediate between symmetric Nash and correlated equilibria. For
simplicity we restrict to symmetric bimatrix (two-player) games throughout. The more
technical multiplayer case will be treated in Part II of this paper, with computational issues
covered in future work.1
1.1 Motivation
A basic tenet of decision theory is that preferences are specific to each individual, and so
interpersonal comparison of utilities is meaningless. In practice this belief is often dropped in
favor of other simplifying assumptions which can be justified within the setting at hand. One
important example of this phenomenon is zero-sum bimatrix games. The zero-sum condition
∗The first author is at Analog Devices | Lyric Labs, reachable at noah.stein@analog.com. The
remaining authors are at the Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems of the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, reachable at asuman@mit.edu and parrilo@mit.edu.
1For more details on these topics, see the first author’s doctoral thesis [33].
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says not only that the players’ preferences over outcomes are opposite, but also that their
preferences over lotteries over outcomes are opposite. This is a very strong condition indeed,
and while it may never be true exactly, it is often a reasonable approximation to model
situations in which there seems to be no opportunity for cooperation.
Similarly, symmetric bimatrix games are an idealization in which we take the roles and
preferences of the players to be identical. When such an approximation is reasonable, we can
also investigate the consequences of a stronger assumption: that the players are independent
instances of an identical decision-making agent, or clones, as it were. Doing so, we should
expect both players would make the same choice when confronted with the same situation.
They interpret their observations of the environment in the same way. If the setup is such
that we have reason to believe that the players will choose their strategies statistically in-
dependently, then our solution concept of choice should be symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Here we explicitly use the assumption that the players are identical; in particular they have
not been provided with a way to break the symmetry so as to choose an asymmetric Nash
equilibrium.2
This raises a natural question: what is the appropriate solution concept to use if statis-
tical independence of actions is not a reasonable assumption and some correlation may be
expected? For a general game the answer would be correlated equilibrium3, so the obvious
answer in the symmetric setting is symmetric correlated equilibrium. That is to say, we
could expect any correlated equilibrium which is invariant (as a probability distribution)
under interchange of the players.
This obvious answer is correct insofar as the symmetry of the situation rules out any
correlated equilibria which are not symmetric. It is our goal to argue that symmetry can
also rule out some of the symmetric correlated equilibria!
To see this, we begin with the tautological statement that each player bases his action on
the state of the world. Perhaps he plays the same action at all states, perhaps not. Insofar
as he does not have full knowledge of the state of the world his action must be based on
some noisy observations of the world.
Since the players are identical they both make the same measurements and interpret
them in the same way, but the outcomes of these measurements may differ. In this way and
only this way may the players’ actions differ. In particular our assumption that the players
are identical means that the players cannot correlate their actions based on knowledge of
each other’s types, or past histories of actions, or any player-specific information. Only
correlation based on the external world is possible.
2General bimatrix games can be symmetrized by considering two copies of the game played simultaneously
with each player taking opposite roles in the two copies. In this way results from the symmetric theory can
be applied to asymmetric games. This idea of players “putting themselves in each other’s shoes” incorporates
a notion of fairness into the analysis of asymmetric games. Rawls explores the philosophical implications
of taking this idea as the basis for a theory of justice [30], though in a way which is at odds with some
fundamental game-theoretic principles [17, 6].
3See Aumann’s argument in [3]. The key assumption forming the basis of that argument is that the
players have common prior beliefs. While this is debatable in some contexts, it is certainly true in the
symmetric setting considered here. Put another way, the philosophical or epistemic argument for correlated
equilibrium is even stronger in symmetric games than in general games.
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For example, the players may wish to base their actions on tomorrow’s weather. This is
an aspect of the underlying state of the world, albeit one which may not be known precisely
to the players (it is a hidden variable), so they can only condition their actions on their
estimates of the weather. Perfect correlation may occur if these estimates are obtained from
a common weather report. Weaker correlation may arise if both players make their own
forecasts in terms of independent measurements of atmospheric data.
We define an exchangeable equilibrium of a symmetric bimatrix game to be a correlated
equilibrium distribution in which the players’ actions are independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) conditioned on some hidden variable (Definition 3.1). These are exactly the
outcomes which could conceivably arise when rational players make independent environ-
mental measurements, then interpret and act on this information in the same way. This is a
version of the “revelation principle” [15] for exchangeable equilibria (compare Proposition 4.6
with Proposition 4.1). Exchangeable equilibria can achieve higher payoffs and social welfare
than symmetric Nash equilibria (Example 5.4).
Over the course of the paper we motivate this definition from several viewpoints: game-
theoretic, probabilistic, algebraic / geometric, and (while leaving a detailed discussion for
future work) computational. We begin by unpacking the definition.
Any probability distribution of two players’ actions X1, X2 can be written as a square
matrix A, with Aij := P(X1 = i and X2 = j). If the actions were i.i.d. their joint distribution
could be written in matrix form as an outer product xxT for some probability vector x. When
the actions are merely conditionally i.i.d. the distribution is in fact a convex combination4∑
i λixix
T
i of terms of this form (λi ≥ 0,
∑
i λi = 1).
We might say that any matrix of probabilities which is not symmetric explicitly breaks
symmetry, whereas a symmetric matrix which is not conditionally i.i.d. implicitly breaks
symmetry. We focus on the exchangeable equilibria, those correlated equilibria which do not
break symmetry at all.
To illustrate this symmetry breaking, consider an m ×m matrix A (symmetric or not)
of probabilities specifying the joint distribution of two random variables and let ei denote
the ith unit column vector. We can write A =
∑
i,j Aijeie
T
j . The matrix eie
T
j is an indepen-
dent distribution corresponding to two constants. Therefore we can always view a sample
taken according to a probability matrix A as the result of two “measurements” which are
conditionally independent given some hidden variable.
Here we have taken the hidden variable to be the result of the two measurements. Sym-
metry is broken in the sense that players’ actions are not identically distributed given the
hidden variable: if the value is (i, j) the first player deterministically plays i and the second
plays j. The players do not map their measurements of the hidden variable to actions in
the same way. Looked at differently, they are not measuring the same aspects of the hidden
variable to determine their choices of action.
In general there are many such decompositions A =
∑
i λixiy
T
i . We only wish to con-
sider matrices A which admit a decomposition A =
∑
i λixix
T
i respecting the symmetry of
4The end result is the same whether we consider finite sums or infinite “convex combinations” weighted
by probability distributions; see Section 2.1.
3
(urow, ucol) Wimpy Macho
Wimpy (4, 4) (1, 5)
Macho (5, 1) (0, 0)
Table 1: The game of Chicken. Two players ride their bikes towards each other. At the
last moment, each can choose to either be Wimpy and veer off to the side, or be Macho
and remain on the collision course. One player chooses a row, the other a column, and the
corresponding cell of the table shows their respective utilities.
the problem. Clearly lack of symmetry of A is an obstruction to the existence of such a
decomposition, but it is not the only obstruction: see Section 1.2 for an example.
Geometrically, the set of exchangeable equilibria arises naturally when considering convex
relaxations of the set of Nash equilibria. Let CESym denote the set of symmetric correlated
equilibria of a symmetric game, and X denote the set of symmetric, rank 1, elementwise
nonnegative matrices, i.e., matrices of the form xxT for column vectors x ≥ 0. Then we have
Nash
CESym ∩X ⊆
convex hull of Nash
conv(CESym ∩X) ⊆
exchangeable
CESym ∩ conv(X) ⊆
correlated
CESym ,
where each type of symmetric equilibrium is defined by the set written below it.
We will discuss three further interpretations of exchangeable equilibria in this paper, in
addition to the above motivations via hidden variables or geometry. First, we show that
these are the equilibria which can arise as a Bayesian observer’s predictions when players
are chosen from a large pool of agents whom the observer views as interchangeable. Second,
we view them as symmetric correlated equilibria of games with many players which can be
broken up into identical symmetric pairwise interactions between these players. In particular
the exchangeable equilibria are those symmetric correlated equilibria which do not depend
on the exact number of players. Third, the exchangeable equilibria are those which can be
implemented with a particular kind of correlation scheme.
1.2 Preview
We illustrate the theory of exchangeable equilibria using the game Chicken (Table 1). This
game has two asymmetric pure Nash equilibria and one symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium.
We write the corresponding joint distributions as matrices. Each entry is the probability of
choosing the corresponding strategy profile.
NE =
{[
0 0
1 0
]
,
[
0 1
0 0
]
,
[
1/4 1/4
1/4 1/4
]}
.
In the same notation a probability matrix [ p qq r ] with p, q, r ≥ 0 and p + 2q + r = 1 is
a symmetric correlated equilibrium if and only if q ≥ p, r. These inequalities define the
polytope
CESym = conv
{[
0 1/2
1/2 0
]
,
[
1/3 1/3
1/3 0
]
,
[
0 1/3
1/3 1/3
]
,
[
1/4 1/4
1/4 1/4
]}
. (1)
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Consider the symmetric correlated equilibrium
B :=
[
0 1/2
1/2 0
]
.
Is it an exchangeable equilibrium? That is to ask, is it conditionally i.i.d.? Equivalently, is
it of the form
∑
λixix
T
i ?
Any matrix of this form would be positive semidefinite, but detB = −1
4
< 0, so B is
not positive semidefinite. It is a symmetric correlated equilibrium which is not exchange-
able. In any game positive semidefiniteness is necessary for a correlated equilibrium to be
exchangeable. Known results (Theorem 2.9) show it is sufficient in games with at most four
strategies.
The same test rules out the second and third extreme points listed in (1) as not exchange-
able. In fact for Chicken the condition that the determinant be nonnegative (q2 ≤ pr) and
the symmetric correlated equilibrium conditions have only one common solution:{[
1/4 1/4
1/4 1/4
]}
= NESym = XESym ( CESym .
This example illustrates several general properties of the set of exchangeable equilibria that
we will establish in this paper: conv(NESym) ⊆ XESym (Proposition 3.3) with equality in
games with two strategies (Theorem 3.6) and XESym ( CESym (Proposition 3.3) with strict
containment whenever asymmetric Nash equilibria exist (Theorem 3.5).
1.3 Previous work
As we will see, the idea of exchangeable equilibrium arises naturally when one combines the
notion of exchangeable random variables with the correlated equilibrium solution concept.
Both of these are large areas of study in their own right and we make no attempt at an
exhaustive survey of the literature of one or the other. However, several papers either have
led toward the idea of exchangeable equilibrium in some way or seem to be particularly
related to what is accomplished by exchangeable equilibria and we review those here.
One such example is Hart and Schmeidler’s minimax proof of the existence of correlated
equilibria [18] or the similar proof by Nau and McCardle [28]. These arguments share
the somewhat mysterious quality that at an intermediate stage they work with product
distributions which are not equilibria, but in the end, just when a correlated equilibrium
is found, the product structure vanishes. The result is a seemingly arbitrary correlated
equilibrium with no apparent extra structure; in particular the equilibrium need not have
the product structure which would make it a more desirable (in the sense of strength of
the existence proof) Nash equilibrium. Considering what extra structure might be obtained
from such an argument, in particular if we require the game to be symmetric and try to
make the argument respect the symmetry as much as possible, is one route to our notion of
exchangeable equilibrium. Two existence proofs along these lines will be presented in Part II
of this paper.
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Another example is Brandenburger’s survey of epistemic game theory [7]. He mentions
that the standard assumption of probabilistic independence of different players’ strategies
in noncooperative game theory is somewhat suspect and perhaps unnatural. In a footnote
he offers the concept of exchangeability as an example of a more natural way to capture
our ignorance of the distinctions between random variables. However, this is not explored
further.
The notion of exchangeable equilibrium bears at least an outward resemblance to the
work of Hillas, Kohlberg, and Pratt on an outside observer’s assessment of the outcome
of a game [19]. They consider an observer watching a given n-player game being played
repeatedly. Each time the game is played by a new set of players disjoint from the set of
all previous players, so the observer views these interactions as exchangeable: he has no
preconceived notions about how the order of these repeated plays relates to their outcomes.
In other words, his prior distribution over actions is not affected by simultaneously swapping
all n players in copy j of the game with the corresponding n players in copy k for any j, k.
The players do not have access to the history of play, though the observer does.
Hillas, Kohlberg, and Pratt characterize correlated equilibria of the original game by
considering whether at each play of the game the observer can offer advice based on his
past observations enabling some player to increase his expected payoff. They argue that the
players should have a better understanding of the game than the observer, and prove that
the limiting distribution of play is a correlated equilibrium if and only if the observer cannot
offer such helpful advice.
If the observer also does not have any preconceived notions about the connections between
the players in each instance of the game (i.e., his prior distribution on actions is not affected
by swapping the copy of player i in instance j of the game with the copy in instance k for any
i, j, k), then Hillas, Kohlberg, and Pratt show that the long-run distribution of play will be
a Nash equilibrium. The paper [19] does not consider solution concepts between Nash and
correlated equilibrium. However, its use of exchangeability suggests an ideological kinship
with the present work. It seems likely that the concept of exchangeable equilibrium could
be reinterpreted in that setup, though we do not do so here.
One interpretation of exchangeable equilibria is that they are those correlated equilibria
which extend to symmetric correlated equilibria of games with an arbitrarily large number of
identical interactions (Section 4.3). That is to say, they are robust to the number of players:
the players could not profitably deviate even if they knew the number of players. This is
in contrast to the paper of Myerson on games with many players in which the number of
players is modeled probabilistically [26]. That work is in a Bayesian game setting and so not
directly comparable to ours, but the distinction between which equilibria are sensitive to a
given probabilistic model and which equilibria are not is worth making. In a given situation,
one assumption or the other may be more natural.
Another interpretation of exchangeable equilibria is that they are those correlated equi-
libria in which the correlating device takes a specific form: the players choose strategies i.i.d.
conditioned on some hidden variable (Section 4.1). In general it is an interesting problem to
study which equilibria can arise when different assumptions are made about the correlating
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device. Of course the most well-studied class of correlating device makes players choose
their strategies independently and corresponds to the mixed Nash equilibria. But there
is also Sorin’s notion of “distribution equilibria,” which are correlated equilibria in which
each player gets the same payoff conditional on all outcomes and which are motivated by
arguments from evolutionary game theory [32]. Another good example of this type is Du’s
classification of the correlated equilibria which can arise when the players correlate on their
hierarchy of beliefs about the play of the game [12].
1.4 Outline
We begin with Section 2, fixing notation and reviewing background material on exchange-
ability, conditionally i.i.d. random variables, games, and equilibria. With all this in place in
Section 3 we introduce exchangeable equilibria and establish their fundamental properties.
The two sections which follow are Section 4 on interpretations and Section 5 on examples.
These are largely independent of each other and can be read in either order. We close with
Section 6 on directions for future work. This final section also outlines the content of Part II
of this paper.
2 Background and notation
In this section we recall some known results to fix notation and language. For further
information on exchangeability see e.g. [10] and on games and equilibria see e.g. [16].
2.1 Probability distributions, exchangeability, and conditionally
i.i.d. random variables
For a (typically finite) set T we write ∆(T ) to denote the set of probability distributions5 on
T . The mass of a singleton t ∈ T under a probability distribution pi ∈ ∆(T ) will be denoted
pi(t) := pi({t}) for simplicity. For finite T we will view ∆(T ) as a set of column vectors and
∆(T 2) := ∆(T×T ) as a set of matrices. All random variables will take values in a set T with
2 ≤ |T | < ∞ to avoid trivialities on one end and unnecessary complications on the other.
We write T n and T∞ for the products of n and countably many copies of T , respectively.
Throughout the paper we will deal with collections of random variables which are ex-
changeable, meaning they are in some sense indistinguishable. Such is the case when the
measurements they represent are unlabeled or labeled in a way which does not relate to
their outcome. We will usually assume these are given to us in some arbitrary order. The
defining property of exchangeability, then, is that the joint distribution does not depend on
this order.
5In case T is infinite, such as when T = ∆(S) for a finite set S, we allow only the Borel probability
measures with respect to an implied topology.
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Definition 2.1. For finite n, a probability distribution in ∆(T n) is n-exchangeable if it
is invariant under permutations of the indices, or in other words, if it represents a sequence
X1, . . . , Xn of T -valued random variables which is equal in distribution to Xσ(1), . . . , Xσ(n)
for all permutations σ on {1, . . . , n}. The set of n-exchangeable distributions is denoted
∆Sym(T
n).
A typical example of an n-exchangeable sequence arises by sampling without replacement.
If 4 white balls and 6 black balls are placed in a bag, shaken, and then removed one by one,
the distribution of the resulting sequence of colors is 10-exchangeable.
Definition 2.2. A probability distribution in ∆(T∞) representing a sequence X1, X2, . . . is
said to be (∞)-exchangeable if it is invariant under permutations of finitely many indices6,
or in other words if the distribution of X1, . . . , Xn is n-exchangeable for all n ∈ N. The set
of exchangeable distributions is denoted ∆Sym(T
∞). We call a finite or infinite sequence of
random variables n-exchangeable of (∞)-exchangeable, respectively, if its distribution
is.
One example of exchangeability is a sequence of i.i.d. fair coin flips, or indeed any i.i.d.
sequence. However, this does not exhaust the possibilities. Another example is the case in
which Xi = X1 almost surely for all i. This is exchangeable regardless of the distribution on
X1, but is only independent in the trivial case when X1 is deterministic.
The definition of exchangeability amounts to a collection of linear equations a given prob-
ability distribution may or may not satisfy. This means the set of exchangeable distributions
is convex: an arbitrary mixture of exchangeable distributions is also exchangeable. Therefore
a sequence of random variables which are i.i.d. conditioned on some other random variable
is exchangeable. In the case of an infinite sequence of exchangeable random variables, the
converse is also true:
Definition 2.3. A (finite or infinite) sequence of random variables is called conditionally
i.i.d. if it is i.i.d. conditioned on some7 random variable.
Theorem 2.4 (de Finetti). An infinite sequence X1, X2, . . . of random variables is exchange-
able if and only if it conditionally i.i.d.
For a proof see e.g. [31]. The upshot is that we can think of any exchangeable sequence
of random variables as arising from a two-stage process8. First, a random element Θ ∈ ∆(T )
is secretly selected according to some distribution in ∆(∆(T )). Second, the sequence of
random variables X1, X2, . . . is constructed to be i.i.d. with distribution Θ.
6This finiteness condition is natural in that it allows us to identify ∆Sym(T
∞) with the inverse limit
lim←−∆Sym(T
n) using the Kolmogorov Consistency Theorem (12.1.2 in [13], for example).
7As always in probability theory, we assume the underlying sample space is rich enough to define whatever
additional random variables we need. Alternatively, we could extend the definition of conditionally i.i.d. to
include any sequence of random variables equal in distribution to a sequence which is conditionally i.i.d. in
the sense of Definition 2.3.
8The classic example of an exchangeable sequence which does not obviously arise in this way is the Po´lya
urn model [29].
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The following two results summarize some facts about conditionally i.i.d. pairs X1, X2
and the set of all distributions thereof. Proposition 2.6 shows that such pairs take a simple
form and will often be invoked implicitly.
Proposition 2.5. Consider the subset of ∆(T 2) corresponding to distributions of pairs
X1, X2 which are conditionally i.i.d. given a parameter taking only finitely many values,
i.e., those which can be written in matrix form as
k∑
i=1
λiwiw
T
i for some k, with all λi > 0 and
k∑
i=1
λi = 1. (2)
This set is convex, compact, and semialgebraic (definable by finitely many polynomial in-
equalities).
Proof. Call the set in question Z. Let X be the set of i.i.d. distributions in ∆(T 2). Then X is
compact and Z is the convex hull of X, so compact and convex[5]. The set X is semialgebraic.
By Carathe´odory’s theorem any element of Z can be written as a convex combination of a
bounded number of elements of X, so Z can be described by a first-order formula over the
real-closed field R. Quantifier elimination then shows that Z is semialgebraic [4].
Proposition 2.6. If a pair X1, X2 is conditionally i.i.d. then we may assume without loss of
generality that the associated parameter takes its values in a finite set. Equivalently, the joint
distribution of X1, X2 is of the form (2). That is to say, the set described in Proposition 2.5
is the set of all conditionally i.i.d. distributions.
Proof. Suppose the pair X1, X2 is i.i.d. conditioned on some parameter Θ with (not neces-
sarily finitely-supported) distribution λ ∈ ∆(∆(T )). The unconditional joint distribution of
X1 and X2 is W :=
∫
wwT dλ(w). By definition of the Lebesgue integral, W is the limit
of conditionally i.i.d. distributions each of whose parameters takes values in some finite set.
The set thereof is compact (Proposition 2.5), so it is closed and contains W .
How can one be sure that two random variables are not conditionally i.i.d.? In other
words, given a probability distribution as a matrix, how can one certify that a decomposition
of the form (2) does not exist? A weak but easily applied condition is:
Proposition 2.7. If X1, X2 are conditionally i.i.d. random variables taking values in the
finite set T and P(X1 = X2 = t) = 0 then P(X1 = t,X2 = t˜) = 0 for all t˜ ∈ T .
Proof. Let Θ be the hidden parameter conditioned on which the Xi are i.i.d. By assumption
Θ satisfies P(X1 = t | Θ) = 0 almost surely, so P(X1 = t) =
∫
P(X1 = t | Θ) dP(Θ) = 0.
Using this condition one can immediately construct symmetric, elementwise nonnegative
matrices which are not the joint distribution of any conditionally i.i.d. pair, such as
[
0 1/2
1/2 0
]
.
A more broadly applicable necessary condition is double nonnegativity.
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Definition 2.8. A matrix is doubly nonnegative if it is symmetric, elementwise nonneg-
ative, and positive semidefinite. The set of doubly nonnegative m ×m matrices is denoted
DNNm.
The advantage of this definition is that double nonnegativity of a matrix is easy to check,
and the definitions immediately yield the forward direction in:
Theorem 2.9. If an m×m matrix is the joint distribution of a conditionally i.i.d. pair then
it is doubly nonnegative and its entries sum to one. The converse holds if and only if m ≤ 4.
Maxfield and Minc’s proof of the converse (which is not obvious from the definitions)
and a counterexample in the m = 5 case due to Hall can be found in [24]. Diananda proved
an equivalent result about the duals of these cones [11]. For our purposes, the utility of this
result is that it allows us to decide quickly whether 4 × 4 and smaller matrices are joint
distributions of conditionally i.i.d. pairs.
2.2 Games and equilibria
Definition 2.10. A (finite) game, denoted by Γ throughout, consists of n ≥ 2 players,
each equipped with a finite set Ci of two or more (pure) strategies and a utility function
ui : C → R, which assigns a real number to each strategy profile in C :=
∏
iCi.
A two-player game is also called a bimatrix game, because the utilities can be specified
by two matrices A,B ∈ RC : Aij = u1(i, j) and Bij = u2(i, j). A bimatrix game is symmet-
ric if B = AT , or in other words if C1 = C2 and u1(s1, s2) = u2(s2, s1) for all (s1, s2) ∈ C.
For a symmetric bimatrix game we let m = |C1|. When it is notationally convenient to do
so, we will assume without loss of generality that C1 = {1, . . . ,m}.
We make the standard assumptions that the number of players, strategy sets, and utility
functions are common knowledge: everyone knows them, everyone knows that everyone
knows them, and so on (see e.g. [16]). For symmetric bimatrix games we make the additional
framing assumptions that each of a player’s strategies has a distinct label, the same set of
labels is used by both players, and this shared labeling is common knowledge. In other words
there is a commonly known bijection between the strategy sets of the players. We will always
take these sets to be equal and the distinguished bijection to be the identity. Changing this
bijection has a profound effect on the game as we see in Examples 5.1 and 5.2. For further
discussion of symmetry and framing see [1, 8, 34].
Definition 2.11. A mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution over his
pure strategy set Ci, and the set of mixed strategies for player i is ∆(Ci). The set of
independent distributions or mixed strategy profiles of the game Γ will be denoted9
∆Π(Γ) :=
∏
i ∆(Ci). For a symmetric bimatrix game Γ, the set of symmetric product
distributions will be denoted
∆ΠSym(Γ) := {pi × pi | pi ∈ ∆(C1)} ⊂ ∆Π(Γ).
9We write ∆Π(Γ) instead of ∆Π(C) because Γ specifies the product structure on C.
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For uniformity of notation we define ∆(Γ) := ∆(C). We extend each player’s utility from
C to ∆(Γ) linearly, defining ui(pi) =
∑
s∈C ui(s)pi(s) for all pi ∈ ∆(Γ).
Definition 2.12. A mixed strategy profile pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) ∈ ∆Π(Γ) is a Nash equilibrium
if ui(pi) ≥ ui(ti, pi−i) for all players i and all ti ∈ Ci. The set of Nash equilibria is denoted
NE(Γ).
Definition 2.13. A distribution pi ∈ ∆(Γ) is a (direct10) correlated equilibrium if for
all players i and all functions f : Ci → Ci
Epi [ui(f(si), s−i)− ui(s)] :=
∑
s∈C
[ui(f(si), s−i)− ui(s)]pi(s) ≤ 0.
Equivalently, pi is a correlated equilibrium if for all i and all si, ti ∈ Ci,∑
s−i∈C−i
[ui(ti, s−i)− ui(s)] pi(s) ≤ 0.
The set of correlated equilibria is denoted CE(Γ).
The interpretation is that pi ∈ ∆(Γ) is a joint distribution of recommended strategies
for the n players. Each player sees only his recommended strategy and pi is a correlated
equilibrium when players are best off following these recommendations rather than deviating.
Viewing NE(Γ) and CE(Γ) as subsets of ∆(Γ), we have NE(Γ) = CE(Γ)∩∆Π(Γ). Nash’s
Theorem states that Nash equilibria exist, hence so do correlated equilibria [27]. In fact in
the same paper Nash also proved a version of this theorem for symmetric games; a special
case of this result is that symmetric bimatrix games admit symmetric Nash equilibria as
defined below.
Definition 2.14. Let Γ be a symmetric bimatrix game. A symmetric Nash equilibrium11
is a (pi1, pi2) ∈ NE(Γ) with pi1 = pi2. The set of such equilibria is denoted NESym(Γ) ⊆
∆ΠSym(Γ). We will at times refer to pi1 itself as a symmetric Nash equilibrium. A symmetric
correlated equilibrium is a pi ∈ CE(Γ) such that pi(s1, s2) = pi(s2, s1) for all s ∈ C, and
the set of these equilibria is denoted CESym(Γ).
In symbols, NESym(Γ) = CE(Γ)∩∆ΠSym(Γ) and CESym(Γ) = CE(Γ)∩∆Sym(Γ). Through-
out the remainder of the paper we will be discussing symmetric bimatrix games and sym-
metric Nash and correlated equilibria; we will occasionally drop the word “symmetric” for
brevity.
From the definitions we obtain the standard facts:
Proposition 2.15. For any game Γ the set NE(Γ) is compact and the set CE(Γ) is a compact
convex polytope. For a symmetric game the same is true of NESym(Γ) and CESym(Γ).
10Some authors use the term “canonical” in place of “direct”. We omit such qualifiers until Section 4.1,
where we will need them to draw a distinction with a more general (“indirect”) notion of correlation.
11Note that symmetric equilibrium concepts are defined as usual in terms of robustness to unilateral (and
so in a sense, asymmetric) deviations, not simultaneous identical deviations.
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3 Basics of exchangeable equilibria
We use Γ to denote a symmetric bimatrix game throughout.
Definition 3.1. A (symmetric) exchangeable equilibrium of Γ is a correlated equi-
librium such that the players’ actions are conditionally i.i.d. The set of such equilibria is
denoted
XESym(Γ) := CE(Γ) ∩ conv ∆ΠSym(Γ).
The text definition agrees with the equation by Proposition 2.6. In this paper we leave a
notion of “asymmetric exchangeable equilibrium” undefined, so we are free to drop the word
“symmetric.”
Here we study geometric properties of exchangeable equilibria and relationships with
symmetric Nash and correlated equilibria. Applying the equivalent characterizations of con-
ditionally i.i.d. sequences presented in Section 2.1 yields equivalent characterizations of ex-
changeable equilibria; we explore interpretations in Section 4. We compute exchangeable
equilibria of examples in Section 5, which is largely independent of Section 4.
Proposition 3.2. The set XESym(Γ) is compact, convex, and semialgebraic.
Proof. The set CE(Γ) is a compact, convex polytope (Proposition 2.15) and conv ∆ΠSym(Γ)
is closed, convex, and semialgebraic (Proposition 2.5).
Proposition 3.3. The equilibrium sets are nested:
conv(NESym(Γ)) ⊆ XESym(Γ) ⊆ CESym(Γ).
Proof. A symmetric Nash equilibrium is an i.i.d. correlated equilibrium, so it is an exchange-
able equilibrium. The set of exchangeable equilibria is convex, so it contains all mixtures of
these. Exchangeable equilibria are symmetric correlated equilibria by definition.
The set of symmetric correlated equilibria is always a compact convex polytope and the
convex hull of the symmetric Nash equilibria is generically so, since there are generically
finitely many symmetric Nash equilibria. The set of exchangeable equilibria need not be
polyhedral: see Example 5.3 below. It can be shown that this set is always semialgebraic,
i.e., described by finitely many polynomial inequalities (proof omitted).
Theorem 3.4. There exists a rational12 exchangeable equilibrium: XESym(Γ) ∩Qm×m 6= ∅.
Proof. Nash’s Theorem [27] gives a symmetric Nash equilibrium (w,w). It is known that w
can be taken to be in Qm. For example we can take w to be an extreme point of a certain
polyhedron defined by linear inequalities with rational coefficients, by a symmetric version
of the argument in [23]. Then wwT ∈ XESym(Γ) ∩Qm×m.
12Here we mean that the coordinates are rational in the algebraic sense, i.e., ratios of integers. By definition
exchangeable equilibria are rational in the game-theoretic incentive-compatibility sense.
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The existence of exchangeable equilibria can be proven, without invoking Nash’s Theorem
or fixed point results, by extending the methods of [18]. We defer details to Part II of this
paper for two reasons. First, the proofs go through in the more general context treated
there. Second, it is not clear whether such methods can prove the existence of a rational
exchangeable equilibrium, a result which we show in Part II to be specific to the two-player
case.
While symmetric games always admit symmetric Nash equilibria, asymmetric Nash equi-
libria can also appear (e.g. in Chicken and Examples 5.2 and 5.3 below). In games with
asymmetric equilibria the set of symmetric correlated equilibria always strictly contains the
exchangeable equilibria:
Theorem 3.5. If NESym(Γ) ( NE(Γ) then XESym(Γ) ( CESym(Γ).
Proof. Let (x, y) ∈ NE(Γ) with x 6= y. Both xyT and yxT are correlated equilibria, so W :=
1
2
(xyT + yxT ) ∈ CESym(Γ). Since x, y ∈ ∆(C1) are distinct, there is a z with zTx < 0 and
zTy > 0. This means W is not positive semidefinite so not conditionally i.i.d. (Theorem 2.9):
zTWz =
1
2
(zTxyT z + zTyxT z) = (zTx)(zTy) < 0.
In general exchangeable equilibria need not be mixtures of symmetric Nash equilibria
(Example 5.3 below), but for two-strategy symmetric bimatrix games this is always the case:
Theorem 3.6. If Γ has m = 2 strategies per player then conv(NESym(Γ)) = XESym(Γ).
Proof. Let A = [ x yz w ] be the payoff matrix for the row player, b := x − z and c := w − y.
An exchangeable equilibrium W = [ p qq r ] must satisfy the correlated equilibrium constraints
and be conditionally i.i.d., which is the same as double nonnegativity per Theorem 2.9.
Altogether the conditions are:
pr ≥ q2 (semidefiniteness),
p, q, r ≥ 0 (nonnegativity),
bp ≥ cq (incentive constraint #1),
cr ≥ bq (incentive constraint #2), and
p+ 2q + r = 1 (normalization).
Let us show that any extreme point W of XESym(Γ) is in NESym(Γ). If pr = q
2 then
rank(W ) = 1, so it is a Nash equilibrium. If q = 0 then we can write W = p [ 1 00 0 ] + r [
0 0
0 1 ] as
a convex combination of symmetric pure Nash equilibria. By extremality p = 0 or r = 0.
The remaining case is that pr > q2 > 0 so semidefiniteness and nonnegativity are not
tight. All other constraints are linear, so extremality requires tightness and linear indepen-
dence of as many of these as there are variables, i.e. all three. Multiplying the tight incentive
constraints yields (bc)pr = (bc)q2. But pr > q2, so b = 0 or c = 0. Then bp = cq and p, q > 0
give b = c = 0. The incentive constraints are trivial, hence linearly dependent, so no extreme
points fall into this case.
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4 Interpretations of exchangeable equilibria
We next study various game-theoretic setups in which exchangeable equilibria arise naturally
as outcomes of games. Of course these are all related (some more obviously than others),
but each has something different to add to the overall picture. Taken together, the fact that
these interpretations each give rise to the same solution concept leads us to conclude that
exchangeable equilibria are natural objects to study.
4.1 Hidden variable interpretation
In this section we formalize the discussion of hidden variables given in the introduction. We
do so by first fixing terminology for a more explicit notion of correlated equilibrium, then
studying these in a symmetric setting.
4.1.1 Indirect correlated equilibria
To study hidden variables we consider an equivalent definition of correlated equilibria in
which the given game is augmented by adding a correlating device which sends the players
pre-play signals. The framework is illustrated in Figure 1. The results of this subsection are
known [2, 3] and presented here for comparison with the Section 4.1.2.
There is some underlying (random) state of the world which is not assumed to be known
to the players. The information available to each player is an arbitrary function of this state
and some private random noise; the state and all the noise signals are assumed independent.
This random noise could for example be measurement noise, or the outcome of some private
coin tosses13 on which a player will base his action – anything which we wish to explicitly
assume the other players cannot access.
For mathematical simplicity we typically think of the state of the world, the noises, and
the players’ information as all taking values in some finite sets. If this is not the case we must
make some measurability restrictions. We speak informally and avoid assigning symbols to
everything involved to prevent an explosion of notation.
Each player chooses a function fi mapping his information to actions. We refer to all
the data together – the state distribution, the noise distributions, the maps from these to
information, and the fi – as a correlation scheme. We assume these data are known to
the players: only the realizations of the random quantities are hidden. If no player can
improve his expected utility by unilaterally deviating to a different function f ′i , we refer
to the correlation scheme as an indirect correlated equilibrium. When we wish to
emphasize the distinction we will refer the content of Definition 2.13 as a direct correlated
equilibrium.
We use the term “indirect” inclusively to mean “not necessarily direct”; the proof of
Proposition 4.1 shows how to view any direct correlated equilibrium as an indirect correlated
13See Proposition 4.2 for an important distinction between measurement noise and private coin tosses and
see Example 5.3 for an illustration thereof.
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State of
the world
“+1”
Noise1
f1 HIDEM
“+n”
Noisen
fn HIDEM
Game
Player 1’s
information
Player 1’s
action
Player 1’s
utility
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information
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action
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Figure 1: In a correlation scheme, each player receives noisy information about the state
of the world (the “+i” indicates the state is being combined with the noise somehow, not
necessarily additively) and chooses his action in the game as a function fi of this information.
If no player can improve his utility by playing a different function of his information, we call
all this data (the functions and the information structure together) an indirect correlated
equilibrium.
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equilibrium. The term “indirect” does not seem to be standard, but we adopt it here to have
an explicit alternative to “direct”.
These two notions of correlation were studied by Aumann in [2] and [3], respectively, and
are closely related by the “revelation principle” [15]. We give a proof here to contrast the
machinery with the symmetric case in Section 4.1.2.
Proposition 4.1 (The Revelation Principle for Correlated Equilibria). The distribution of
actions in an indirect correlated equilibrium is a direct correlated equilibrium and every direct
correlated equilibrium arises in this way.
Proof. Given an indirect correlated equilibrium, no player can gain by deviating from fi.
In particular no player can gain by deviating to ζi ◦ fi for any ζi : Ci → Ci. Therefore
if we push the fi back into the unobserved part of the model in Figure 1, merging it into
the noise-adding stage, the result is an indirect correlated equilibrium in which all players
choose the identity function from their information to their action. This coincides with the
definition of what it means for the distribution over information / actions to be a direct
correlated equilibrium.
Conversely, given a pi ∈ ∆(Γ) we can design a correlation scheme in which the state of
the world is a random strategy profile distributed according to pi, each player’s information
is equal to his personal component of this strategy profile (so the “noise adding” step just
strips away the other players’ choices of strategy – no additional randomness is needed), and
each fi is the identity on Ci. By the definitions this is an indirect correlated equilibrium if
and only if pi is a direct correlated equilibrium.
For a given correlation scheme we say that a player knows the state of the world if
the state of the world is a function of (measurable with respect to) his information. This
means that player knows all relevant information which he can know in theory, but not the
outcomes of the other players’ private coin tosses. We have built some redundancy into
the model in the sense that we could have chosen to push all the random noise into the
state of the world, making each player’s information a deterministic function of the state.
However, the resulting model would not allow for private coin tosses. Compare the following
statements:
Proposition 4.2. In an indirect correlated equilibrium, if each player knows the state of the
world then the outcome conditioned on the state is a Nash equilibrium almost surely, and
every Nash equilibrium arises in this way.
Proposition 4.3. In an indirect correlated equilibrium, if each player knows the state of
the world and all the noise signals are constant (or equivalently are considered part of the
state) then the outcome conditioned on the state is a pure Nash equilibrium almost surely,
and every pure Nash equilibrium arises in this way.
The proofs of these propositions amount to little more than repeating the definitions.
The main idea is that if the players commonly know the state, then conditioned on this
knowledge their play is independent and each is best replying to his opponent. That is to
say, the outcome is conditionally a Nash equilibrium, which must be pure if the players
cannot privately randomize.
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4.1.2 Fully symmetric indirect correlated equilibria
In the introduction we assumed that the players are copies of an identical decision-making
agent. Thus players perform identical experiments and flip identical coins, interpreting and
acting on the results in the same way. Randomness in these outcomes is the one way in
which differences in the players’ actions arise. Stated precisely:
Definition 4.4. We say that a correlation scheme is fully symmetric14 if all players have
the same noise distribution, mapping from state and noise to information, and mapping fi
from information to action. We say that an indirect correlated equilibrium is fully sym-
metric if it arises from a fully symmetric correlation scheme.
The notion of correlation schemes is well-studied [2], but to the authors’ knowledge this
fully symmetric version has not been considered. Under a fully symmetric correlation scheme,
the players’ noise distributions are i.i.d., so their information, and hence actions, are i.i.d.
conditioned on the state. We immediately obtain the expected extension of Proposition 4.2:
Proposition 4.5. In a fully symmetric indirect correlated equilibrium, if each player knows
the state of the world then the outcome conditioned on the state is a symmetric Nash equi-
librium almost surely, and every symmetric Nash equilibrium arises in this way.
On the other hand the generalization of Proposition 4.1 looks a bit different:
Proposition 4.6 (The Revelation Principle for Exchangeable Equilibria). The distribution
of actions in a fully symmetric indirect correlated equilibrium is an exchangeable equilibrium
and every exchangeable equilibrium arises in this way.
Proof. By Proposition 4.1 this distribution is a correlated equilibrium. It is also i.i.d. con-
ditioned on the state, so it is exchangeable.
Conversely, let pi be any exchangeable equilibrium. Then we can write pi =
∑k
i=1 λixix
T
i
for some xi ∈ ∆(C1) and some probability vector λ. Construct a fully symmetric correlation
scheme with k states of the world chosen according to the distribution λ. In state i, choose
each player’s information i.i.d. according to xi. Let the mappings from information to action
all be the identity map. Then the distribution over actions is pi, and since this is in particular
a direct correlated equilibrium, the resulting correlation scheme is a fully symmetric indirect
correlated equilibrium.
Under sufficiently strong symmetry assumptions, the widely used equivalence between
indirect and direct correlated equilibria breaks down. Instead, fully symmetric indirect
correlated equilibria give rise to exchangeable equilibria.
Thus we conclude that there are games (such as Examples 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 below, or
any symmetric game admitting asymmetric Nash equilibria as shown in Theorem 3.5) ad-
mitting symmetric direct correlated equilibria which cannot be realized by any fully sym-
metric indirect correlated equilibria because they fail to be exchangeable. Implementing
14We use the term “fully symmetric” in place of simply “symmetric” to distinguish from arbitrary correla-
tion schemes which result in symmetric distributions over actions. In particular, we rule out cases in which
the state of the world is able to introduce asymmetries between the players.
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(uRow, uColumn) My name is Alice My name is Bob
My name is Alice (0, 0) (1, 1)
My name is Bob (1, 1) (0, 0)
Table 2: Anti-coordinating based on player identity.
such equilibria requires implicit symmetry-breaking. On the other hand, some direct corre-
lated equilibria outside the convex hull of the Nash equilibria can be implemented without
symmetry-breaking; again see Example 5.3. Such exchangeable equilibria can also achieve
higher payoffs / social welfare than the symmetric Nash equilibria as in Example 5.4.
Such symmetry-breaking should not be viewed as pathological. It occurs whenever the
state of the world is taken to include information which distinguishes the players, such as
their types or some common knowledge about their past interactions. Such information can
break symmetry in play even when the payoffs are symmetric, resulting in non-exchangeable
symmetric correlated equilibria or even asymmetric correlated equilibria (the following sub-
section gives an example). As such, fully symmetric correlation schemes – and so exchange-
able equilibria – arise when players correlate their actions based on features of the external
world rather than features of the players themselves.
4.2 Unknown opponent interpretation
As in the previous section on the hidden variable interpretation, here we again focus on
games in which the symmetry includes not only the action spaces and payoffs, but also the
roles of the players in a wider sense. Kuzmics and Rogers argue formally for symmetric Nash
equilibria in symmetric games when players are ignorant about (the payoff-irrelevant types
of) their opponents [22]. In this section we show by example that a simple interpretation of
ignorance of one’s opponent leads to exchangeable equilibria when correlation is allowed.
Consider the anti-coordination game of Example 5.2 with its strategies named as in
Table 2. We will first give two examples of choices of players without this symmetry and
then an example with this symmetry. Note that because of the symmetry of the payoffs,
we do not have to select who will be the row player and who will be the column player. In
particular this information is not available to help the players coordinate on an equilibrium.
Suppose first that this game were played by two people named Alice and Bob whose
names were common knowledge. It is reasonable to predict that the players would have no
trouble coordinating on the pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which each player correctly
identifies his own name. Suppose secondly that this game were played by two friends named
Alice. It may still be possible for them to coordinate based on, say, the common knowledge
that one of them has the middle name Roberta and the other does not.
Suppose finally that two arbitrary Alices are selected from the record-breaking crowd at
this year’s Conference of Game Theorists Named Alice. They are sequestered in separate
rooms and asked to choose the action they would play in this game against an opponent
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chosen from the same conference who has been given the same information. It is common
knowledge that both players are attending the conference, but no further information is
given. As Bayesian observers, how should we expect them to play? The standard Bayesian
way to capture our ignorance of any distinctions between the possible players is to say that
the distribution over outcomes should be symmetric. Based on the conference title we can
assume common knowledge of rationality, so by Aumann’s result [3] we should expect the
Alices to play a correlated equilibrium. In particular we should not expect both to play “My
name is Alice” with probability one.
What else can we say about the outcome? The best symmetric correlated equilibrium in
terms of payoff is W =
[
0 1/2
1/2 0
]
. Is this a reasonable solution?
We claim that W would not be played. Suppose for a contradiction that W were the
expected distribution of outcomes and consider asking a third Alice – recall the record
attendance – what action (“Alice” or “Bob”) she would play in the game. The chosen
strategies A1, A2, and A3 of the three Alices would all be random variables, and their joint
distribution would be symmetric under arbitrary permutations of the Alices. In particular all
the pairwise distributions of two of these random variables would be given by W . Consulting
W , we see that the events E1 = {A2 = A3}, E2 = {A1 = A3}, and E3 = {A1 = A2} would
each occur with probability zero, therefore so would their union E = E1∪E2∪E3. But there
are only two strategies in the game, so in any realization at least two of the Ai must be equal
by the pigeonhole principle. That is to say, E must occur with probability one regardless of
the distribution of the Ai, a contradiction.
On the other hand, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which each player randomizes
over her actions with equal probability does not suffer from this difficulty: one can create
a sequence of i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2) random variables for any number of Alices. Such a se-
quence has a distribution which is exchangeable and has the desired mixed equilibrium as
its marginal distribution corresponding to any choice of two players.
Strictly speaking we have only argued that the observed correlated equilibrium should
extend to an N -exchangeable sequence A1, . . . , AN , where N is the number of Alices at the
conference. However, with N assumed to be large, it is more natural to consider equilibria
which could be extended to an arbitrary number of attendees. In particular this ensures that
we select only the equilibria which are robust to the exact size of the pool and the players’
knowledge thereof.
Being a bit more formal, we consider situations in which the players are drawn from a
pool of N interchangeable agents (2 ≤ N ≤ ∞). We interpret interchangeability as meaning
that all N agents choose a hypothetical action for the game, regardless of whether they are
selected to play, and the joint distribution of these actions is N -exchangeable. Whichever
two agents are chosen to play the game, we assume they choose their actions in their best
interests, in the sense that their joint distribution is a correlated equilibrium. That is to say,
the N agents choose their actions according to an N -exchangeable equilibrium:
Definition 4.7. For 2 ≤ N ≤ ∞ an N-exchangeable equilibrium of Γ is an N -
exchangeable distribution of random variables Xi such that the marginal distribution of
X1 and X2 is a correlated equilibrium of Γ. The set of N -exchangeable equilibria is denoted
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XESym(Γ, N) ⊆ ∆Sym(CN1 ).
The sets of N -exchangeable equilibria shrink as N increases, in the sense that if N2 > N1
and X1, . . . , XN2 is an N2-exchangeable equilibrium, then X1, . . . , XN1 is an N1-exchangeable
equilibrium. Letting N go to infinity, Theorem 2.4 (De Finetti’s Theorem) gives a sort of
convergence15 to exchangeable equilibria:
Corollary 4.8. The distribution of two random variables X1, X2 with values in C1 is an
exchangeable equilibrium if and only if it is the bivariate marginal distribution of an infinite
sequence X1, X2, X3, . . . which is an ∞-exchangeable equilibrium.
Therefore we may view exchangeable equilibria as exactly those correlated equilibria aris-
ing when players are selected from a large pool of interchangeable agents and their identities
are unknown to each other. It makes sense to say that the notion of exchangeable equilibria
eliminates those correlated equilibria which are “unreasonable” on the grounds of symmetry
arguments such as the one made above. On the other hand, when Alice and Bob play the
game in Table 2 these kinds of symmetry arguments do not apply, so it is plausible that they
will play an equilibrium which is not exchangeable, perhaps even asymmetric.
4.3 Many player interpretation
Another way to view exchangeable equilibria is as limits of symmetric correlated equilibria
of N -player games consisting of many identical pairwise interactions16. Given a symmetric
bimatrix game Γ we define a symmetric N -player game Γ(N) in which player i has strategy
set C
(N)
i = C1 and utility function
u
(N)
i (s1, . . . , sN) =
∑
j 6=i
u1(si, sj).
That is to say, each player plays Γ against each other player, choosing the same strategy in
each instance. If N = 2 we recover the original game: Γ(2) = Γ.
Example 4.9. We give another interpretation of the anti-coordination game Γ whose utilities
are shown in Table 2. The story is different from the one in the previous section, so we
simply refer to the strategies as ‘A’ and ‘B’. The utilities of the N -player game Γ(N) are
given by
u
(N)
i (s1, . . . , sN) = #{j : sj 6= si},
so each player wants to choose whichever strategy is chosen by fewer of his opponents. This is
a version of “The Minority Game” introduced by Challet and Zhang [9]. One interpretation
15While N2-exchangeable equilibria induce N1-exchangeable equilibria for N2 > N1, we cannot properly
say that the sets are nested as “XESym(Γ, N2) ⊆ XESym(Γ, N1)” because these are distributions over different
numbers of random variables. With the language of inverse (or projective) limits it is possible to make
sense of the convergence of this sequence of sets as N goes to infinity and show that the limit, which can be
thought of as “
⋂∞
N=2 XESym(Γ, N)”, is XESym(Γ,∞). For details see Part II.
16These games are symmetric versions of polymatrix games [20]. They are also instances of pairwise-
interaction games [14], themselves a form of graphical games [21].
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is that the N players are choosing between two equally good restaurants, A and B, so each
player wants to eat at the less crowded restaurant.
The game Γ(N) is symmetric under arbitrary permutations of theN players, so it is natural
to focus on correlated equilibria of this game which are also symmetric, i.e., N -exchangeable.
We now show that these are exactly the N -exchangeable equilibria of Definition 4.7. The
reason is that the utility for a player in Γ(N) is summed over all his N − 1 interactions, so by
linearity only the bivariate marginal of an N -exchangeable distribution matters to determine
whether it is a correlated equilibrium of Γ(N). A simple computation then shows that the
correct condition on this bivariate marginal is that it be a correlated equilibrium of Γ.
Proposition 4.10. For finite17 N symmetric correlated equilibria of Γ(N) are the same as
N-exchangeable equilibria of Γ.
Proof. For any f : C1 → C1we have
Eu(N)1 (f(X1), X2, . . . , XN) = E
N∑
i=2
u1(f(X1), Xi) =
N∑
i=2
Eu1(f(X1), Xi)
=
N∑
i=2
Eu1(f(X1), X2) = (N − 1)Eu1(f(X1), X2),
with the same analysis holding for all the other players. Therefore there exists an f which
can improve the payoff of some player in Γ(N) under recommendations X1, . . . , XN if and
only if there exists such an f in Γ under recommendations X1, X2.
Thus exchangeable equilibria correspond to symmetric correlated equilibria of N -player
extensions of the game for arbitrary N . Given that the original game was symmetric, it
is reasonable to expect that equilibria with a high degree of symmetry would be focal (apt
to be chosen over other equilibria because they attract attention by being “better” in some
way). This is another reason we might expect players to play an exchangeable equilibrium.
Example 4.9. (cont’d) Which equilibria should we expect to be played in The Minority
Game? There are an abundance of pure equilibria of Γ(N); these are exactly the strategy
profiles in which
⌊
N
2
⌋
players choose one restaurant and
⌈
N
2
⌉
choose the other. These all
have the disadvantage of not being symmetric in the players. While such equilibria can be
justified with an evolutionary model [9], they do not make as much sense in a symmetric
one-shot game.
We can symmetrize by constructing a correlated equilibrium which picks one of these
pure Nash equilibria uniformly at random. This yields an N -exchangeable equilibrium piN .
One can show that if N is odd then piN+1 is the unique extension of piN to an (N + 1)-
exchangeable distribution (the extra player in Γ(N+1) goes to the less populated restaurant).
On the other hand, if N is even then there is no (N + 1)-exchangeable pi ∈ ∆Sym(CN+11 )
17We do not interpret ∞-exchangeable equilibria directly as symmetric correlated equilibria of some game
to avoid technical difficulties related to games with infinitely many players.
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extending piN . This means piN cannot be extended to an (N + 2)-exchangeable sequence for
any N .
In particular, there is no symmetric way to extend any piN to a correlated equilibrium of
all the games Γ(k) simultaneously. Therefore expecting the players to actually play one of
the piN means assuming that the value of N ± 1 (depending on the parity of N) is common
knowledge. This assumption seems dubious in this model.
We claim it is more natural to look for a solution which is robust to the value of N .
This could be accomplished in a number of ways, such as by fixing some value N which is
much greater than the actual expected number of players and using piN (which only solves the
problem in an approximate sense), or by assuming the players have a probability distribution
over possible values of N [26]. Exchangeable equilibria are those which are the most robust
to the value of N ; namely, they are correlated equilibria of Γ(N) for all N .
The unique exchangeable equilibrium of the anti-coordination game in Table 2 is the
mixed Nash equilibrium (proven in Example 5.2 below). That is to say, the only Bayesian
rational strategy of the players in The Minority Game which is symmetric and makes sense
regardless of the number of players is for everyone to choose a restaurant uniformly at
random.
Returning to an arbitrary symmetric bimatrix game Γ, the games Γ(N) are instances of
the pairwise-interaction games studied in [14]. These are games in which multiple players
play many copies of a symmetric bimatrix game, each player choosing the same action in
all copies of this base game in which he participates. The pairwise-interaction structure is
specified by a graph whose nodes are players and whose edges specify which pairs of players
compete in the base game; in the case of Γ(N) this is the complete graph on N vertices. The
book chapter [14] covers problems of computing Nash equilibria given this graph as input;
here we are concerned with those symmetric correlated equilibria which persist as the graph
grows.
The exchangeable equilibria correspond to symmetric correlated equilibria of Γ(N) si-
multaneously for all N and this seems to be robust to how exactly we formulate Γ(N). In
particular an N -exchangeable equilibrium of a symmetric bimatrix game is a correlated equi-
librium of the associated pairwise-interaction games for all graphs on N vertices, not just
complete graphs. Furthermore, we could allow the players to consider different deviations
for different opponents in this interaction graph, in which case the exchangeable equilibria
would correspond exactly to the symmetric correlated equilibria in which the players choose
the same action against all opponents. Proofs of both facts mimic that of Proposition 4.10.
4.4 Sealed envelope implementation
For 1 ≤ N ≤ ∞ we can assign another interpretation to XESym(Γ, N) in terms of which
correlated equilibria can be implemented by a certain type of correlation scheme. Suppose
Γ is to be played by two players who have access to a common pile of N indistinguishable
sealed envelopes, each of which contains a slip of paper on which an element of C1 is written.
The contents of these envelopes play the role of the recommendations in the formulation of
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(direct) correlated equilibrium.
Each player is allowed to choose one envelope and base his choice of action in Γ on its
contents, which he examines privately. We assume that there is some mechanism in place
preventing both players from choosing the same envelope (e.g. a random one of them is
required to select a different envelope).
The fact that the envelopes are indistinguishable means that the distribution over their
contents should be exchangeable, since we would lose no information by shuffling the en-
velopes randomly. This distribution is an n-exchangeable equilibrium if and only if it is a
Nash equilibrium of this larger game (including the envelope selection process) for both play-
ers to choose distinct envelopes in an arbitrary fashion and then play the strategy written
inside the envelope they choose. In particular, they cannot exploit the knowledge of which
envelope the other player will choose in any way.
5 Examples
In this section we compare the sets of Nash, exchangeable, and correlated equilibria of some
small example games. The main tool for doing so is Theorem 2.9.
Our first two examples are 2× 2 games, including the anti-coordination game discussed
in the introduction, illustrating the general fact that XESym = conv(NESym) for such games
(Theorem 3.6). Third we show that the sets conv(NESym), XESym, and CESym can all be
distinct for 3× 3 games and that XESym need not be polyhedral. Fourth and finally we give
a 3 × 3 example showing the the maximum values of the expected utility / social welfare
achievable by symmetric correlated, exchangeable, and Nash equilibria can all be distinct.
All examples except the fourth are symmetric bimatrix games of identical interest, i.e.,
they satisfy A = AT = B. The richness of behavior that arises in these games is interesting
because identical interest games (A = B) are often thought of as somewhat trivial; any payoff
maximizer is a pure Nash equilibrium, for example. However, the pure Nash equilibria need
not be symmetric, so when restricting attention to symmetric equilibria identical interest
games seem to be a less trivial class.
Example 5.1. Consider the coordination game with utility matricesA = B = [ 1 00 1 ]. Parametrize
symmetric probability matrices as [ p qq r ] with p, q, r ≥ 0 and p + 2q + r = 1. Then the cor-
related equilibrium conditions are exactly p ≥ q and r ≥ q. Note that together these imply
that pr ≥ q2, so any symmetric correlated equilibrium is automatically positive semidefinite
(the principal minors are nonnegative), hence conditionally i.i.d. by Theorem 2.9 and so
exchangeable. Therefore the set of symmetric exchangeable equilibria is the same as the set
of symmetric correlated equilibria and a simple computation shows that these sets are equal
to
CESym = XESym = conv
{[
1 0
0 0
]
,
[
0 0
0 1
]
,
[
1/4 1/4
1/4 1/4
]}
= conv(NESym).
Example 5.2. Consider the anticoordination game with utility matrices A = B = [ 0 11 0 ]
discussed in Section 4.2 and again in the context of The Minority Game in Section 4.3. Up
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to a positive affine transformation of the utilities this game is the same as the game Chicken
analyzed in Section 1.2, and so has the same equilibria:{[
1/4 1/4
1/4 1/4
]}
= NESym = XESym
( CESym = conv
{[
0 1/2
1/2 0
]
,
[
1/3 1/3
1/3 0
]
,
[
0 1/3
1/3 1/3
]
,
[
1/4 1/4
1/4 1/4
]}
.
The games in Examples 5.1 and 5.2 could be said to be isomorphic as bimatrix games
but not as symmetric bimatrix games, in the sense that one can be transformed into the
other by relabeling the strategies, but not by using the same relabeling for both players. This
accounts for the fact that their sets of symmetric exchangeable equilibria are not isomorphic.
The difference corresponds to the fact that when these games are played by many players
simultaneously, there is a symmetric (with respect to the players) way to break symmetry
between the two pure strategies in the case of the coordination game but not in the case of
the anticoordination game.
Also note that in both cases we had XESym = conv(NESym) as predicted by Theorem 3.6.
We now construct a 3× 3 game with conv(NESym) ( XESym ( CESym.
Example 5.3. Consider the game with utilities
A = B =
2 2 02 1 2
0 2 2
 .
First, we show strict containment in XESym ( CESym. Second, we show strict containment
in conv(NESym) ( XESym. Third, we observe that XESym is not polyhedral. These results
are summarized in Figure 2.
The matrix
W 1 =
1
4
0 1 01 0 1
0 1 0

is a correlated equilibrium because both players get their maximum payoff with probability
one. By Proposition 2.7 it is not conditionally i.i.d., so it is a correlated equilibrium which
is not exchangeable. In fact we can say more: W 1 cannot be extended to a 3-exchangeable
distribution. Suppose X1, X2, X3 were random variables with a 3-exchangeable distribution
taking values in {a, b, c} such that the distribution of X1 and X2 were W 1. Then
1
4
= P(X1 = a) ≤ P ((X1 = a,X2 6= b) ∨ (X1 = a,X3 6= b) ∨ (X2 = b,X3 = b))
≤ P(X1 = a,X2 6= b) + P(X1 = a,X3 6= b) + P(X2 = b,X3 = b)
= 2W 111 + 2W
1
13 +W
1
22 = 0,
which is a contradiction, so no such 3-exchangeable distribution exists.
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Comparison of equilibrium sets for the game in Table 2
 
 
CESym(K)
XESym(K,3)
XESym(K)
conv(NESym(K))
NESym(K)
W1
W2
Figure 2: Comparison of equilibrium sets for the game in Example 5.3. These sets are
naturally sets of symmetric 3× 3 matrices (or in the case of XESym(Γ, 3), a set of 3× 3× 3
arrays), but we have chosen a projection into two dimensions which highlights the separation
between the sets. The set of exchangeable equilibria is not polyhedral despite the fact that
the other sets are.
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One can also verify that
W 2 =
1
8
1 1 01 2 1
0 1 1
 = 1
8
1 01 1
0 1
[1 1 0
0 1 1
]
is a correlated equilibrium, and the exhibited factorization shows that W 2 is conditionally
i.i.d., hence exchangeable. This factorization can be interpreted as a fully symmetric correla-
tion scheme: the state of the world is s = a or s = c with equal probability and conditioned
on the state, the players are each independently told to play either s or b with equal probabil-
ity. Or equivalently, the players make independent measurements of the state which succeed
and return the true state s half the time and fail and return “inconclusive” the other half of
the time, leading the players to play s and b, respectively.
Given this information structure it is an equilibrium for each player to play his recom-
mendation / measurement. Note that if the players always knew the true state and were
never told ‘b’ then this would no longer be an equilibrium. That is to say, the distribution of
actions conditioned on the state is not always a Nash equilibrium; indeed it is not in either
state.
In fact W 2 is not a convex combination of Nash equilibria at all. Suppose for a contradic-
tion that it were. Then at least one of the Nash equilibria in the convex combination would
have to assign positive probability to the strategy profile (b, b). Suppose player 2 did not
play c with positive probability in such a Nash equilibrium. Given this information, player 1
prefers a to b, so player 1 cannot choose b with positive probability in such an equilibrium, a
contradiction. Symmetric arguments show that each player must play all his strategies with
positive probability. Therefore this Nash equilibrium has full support. But W 2 has entries
which are zero, hence this Nash equilibrium cannot be included in an expression of W 2 as
a convex combination of Nash equilibria. Thus W 2 is not a convex combination of Nash
equilibria.
This argument also shows that the only symmetric Nash equilibrium which assigns pos-
itive probability to b is the one with full support, which a simple computation shows to be[
1
4
1
2
1
4
]
. The only other symmetric Nash equilibria are
[
1 0 0
]
and
[
0 0 1
]
. There
can be no symmetric Nash equilibrium which assigns zero probability to b but positive prob-
ability to both a and c. Such an equilibrium would have to assign equal probability to a and
c, but b is the unique best response to such a mixture.
As is well known, the set of correlated equilibria of a game is always polyhedral, hence so
is the set of k-exchangeable equilibria. The set of Nash equilibria is generically finite, so its
convex hull is polyhedral for generic games (and for this game in particular). It is visually
evident, and can be proven algebraically, that the projection of the set of exchangeable
equilibria pictured in Figure 2 is not polyhedral. In fact it is an algebraic curve of degree
11 which factors into three linear components, a quadratic component, and a degree six
component over Q. Two of the linear components are easily visible (the bottom and left of
the convex hull of the symmetric Nash equilibria), and the third corresponds to the maximum
y value, attained along the line segment joining (11
36
, 1
6
) to (1
3
, 1
6
). The quadratic component
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corresponds to the curved portion of the boundary to the right of this maximum and is
defined by the vanishing of x2 + 2xy + 4y2 − x. The degree six component is the curved
portion of the boundary to the left of the maximum; we omit its equation for brevity.
Example 5.4. We show that the maximum expected utilities achievable by symmetric cor-
related equilibria, exchangeable equilibria, and symmetric Nash equilibria are all distinct in
the game Γ with payoffs
A = BT =
0 1 12 1 0
1 0 1
 .
The same is true with social welfare in place of utility; for symmetric bimatrix games and
symmetric probability distributions both players receive the same expected utility, so the
social welfare is just twice this utility. The symmetric probability distribution
W 1 =
 0 1/2 01/2 0 0
0 0 0

gives both players an expected utility of 3
2
. Symmetric distributions always give both players
the same utility in symmetric bimatrix games and W 1 is the only symmetric distribution
(equilibrium or not) which yields a utility this high. One can verify that W 1 is a correlated
equilibrium, but it is not exchangeable by Proposition 2.7 because it has zero diagonal, so
W 1 ∈ CESym(Γ)\XESym(Γ). Furthermore W 1 achieves a higher utility than any exchangeable
equilibrium.
The distribution
W 2 :=
5
7
1/87/8
0
1/87/8
0
T + 2
7
1/80
7/8
1/80
7/8
T = 1
64
1 5 25 35 0
2 0 14

is exchangeable and it is also a correlated equilibrium, so it is an exchangeable equilibrium
yielding expected utility 17
16
to both players.
Suppose for a contradiction that there were a symmetric Nash equilibrium (x, x) with
expected utility xTAx > 1. Since x is a probability vector, [Ax]1, [Ax]3 ≤ 1. But xTAx is
a convex combination of [Ax]1, [Ax]2, and [Ax]3, so [Ax]2 > 1. Therefore strategy 2 is the
unique best response to x. Only best responses are played with positive probability in a Nash
equilibrium, so x = [ 0 1 0 ]. But then the expected utility is xTAx = 1, a contradiction. Thus
there is no symmetric Nash equilibrium which yields utility greater than 1. In particular
W 2 ∈ XESym(Γ) \ conv(NESym(Γ)) and W 2 achieves a higher utility than any symmetric
Nash equilibrium.
Indeed, Gambit [25] computes that there are two symmetric pure Nash equilibria [ 0 1 0 ]
and [ 0 0 1 ] as well as one symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium [ 14
1
4
1
2 ]. Both pure equilibria
yield utility 1 and the mixed equilibrium yields utility 3
4
.
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6 Conclusions and Future Work
In the case of symmetric bimatrix games, we have argued that the exchangeable equilibria
are a natural mathematical object with a variety of game-theoretic interpretations. The set
of exchangeable equilibria lies between the sets of Nash and correlated equilibria, and its
structural properties are a mix of the two. It is convex like the correlated equilibria, but its
semialgebraicity and nonpolyhedrality remind one more of Nash equilibria.
The exchangeable equilibria are not the only object living in the gap between the Nash
and correlated equilibria. There are also, for example, Sorin’s distribution equilibria [32],
which neither contain nor are contained in the exchangeable equilibria. We believe there is
room for more insight to be gained interpolating between Nash and correlated equilibria.
In this paper we have largely ignored the question of what “exchangeable equilibrium”
should mean in symmetric games with more than two players. We extend the theory to such
games in Part II, studying what is required of the symmetry structure to obtain theoretical
results like those of Section 3 and interpretations along the lines of Section 4 of this paper.
This more abstract setting is a natural one for proving existence of exchangeable equilibria
by adapting Hart and Schmeidler’s argument [18]. We also modify the sealed envelope
interpretation of Section 4.4 to design a hierarchy of nested convex sets called higher order
exchangeable equilibria interpolating between the exchangeable equilibria and the convex
hull of the symmetric Nash equilibria, to which they converge in the limit.
These ideas and relevant computational questions are all explored further in the first
author’s doctoral thesis [33].
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